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CASENOTES

Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary: If
at First You Don't Succeed...

I.

INTRODUCTION

At what territorial point do aliens become entitled to the protections
accorded them under the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA")?'
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. v.Baker," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary3 held that the protections accorded aliens in Section 243(h)(1) of the INA apply to all aliens, regardless of their location within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.' The Eleventh Circuit in Baker had previously determined
that Section 243(h)(1) applied only to aliens found within the jurisdictional confines of the United States as defined in the INA." The Supreme
Court will soon resolve this split among circuits. s
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
2. 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992).

3. 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992).
4. Id. at 1357. The INA defines "alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988).
5. 953 F.2d at 1505. "The term 'United States'... means the continental United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States." 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(38) (1988).
6. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 5, 1992. 113 S.Ct. 52 (1992).

960

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 7
Prior to 1980, Section 243(h) of the INA stated that
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion and for such period of time he deems to be necessary for such
reasons.$
The Refugee Act of 1980 replaced this section with two subparagraphs.9
The first of these provided that "[tihe Attorney General shall not deport
or return any alien. . . to a country if the Attorney General determines
that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such a country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."1 The most significant change for purposes
here was the deletion of "within the United States" as a clause restricting
the prior section's applicability to certain aliens."
In 1981 the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") and the
Coast Guard began to enforce the provisions of the United States-Haiti
agreement'2 which Secretary of State Schultz had entered into at the bequest of President Reagan.' s The Coast Guard and the INS utilized an
interdiction program for intercepting Haitian vessels in international waters until some time after September 30, 1991, when a military coup in
Haiti resulted in greatly increased migrations." Because of the coup's ef7. For a more detailed description of Haitian immigration from 1981 to 1991, see
Baker, 953 F.2d at 1500-1503.
8. 8 U.S:C. § 1253(h) (1976).
9. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1253(h)(1), (2) (Supp. 1992)).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).

11. See infra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
12. Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, September 23, 1981,

U.S.-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241.
13. President Reagan issued an executive order earlier in 1981 requiring the Secretary of
State to enter "cooperative arrangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal immigration to the United States by sea." Exec. Order No. 12,324,
46 Fed. Reg. 48,210 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (Supp. 1992) (Executive Order).

14. Under this particular interdiction program, the Coast Guard, accompanied by INS
officers, would interdict vessels carrying Haitian aliens in international waters. The INS
officers would determine by a process known as "pre-screening" which individuals on board
had a "credible fear of persecution." Those aliens meeting this standard were "screened in"

and eventually transported to the United States where they could attempt to establish refugee status. Those aliens unsuccessful in showing a "credible fear" were "screened out" and
repatriated to Haiti. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL
155853, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992).
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fect, repatriations were temporarily- suspended under the 'program.1 The
Baker litigation came about as a result of the government's resuming of
its repatriation policy.
Five days after the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in Baker, the
INS altered its interdiction program to accommodate the dangers posed
by Haitian aliens who might be infected with the AIDS virus' e Based on
this change in immigration policy after Baker, several Haitian service organizations ("HSO's") and a class of Haitian aliens filed suit against the
government.17 In particular, the HSO's challenged the government's actions of not allowing aliens interred at Guantanamo Naval base in Cuba
access to legal counsel as violative of their First Amendment18 rights to
free speech and association; the aliens challenged the same actions on the
basis of Fifth Amendment 1 ' due process violations and asserted several
statutory violations as well.20 Plaintiffs collectively sought a preliminary
from denying Haitians interred at
injunction forbidding the government
21
counsel.
legal
to
access
Guantanamo
The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because both the HSO and Haitian plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction and had raised
serious meritorious questions concerning their respective First and Fifth
Amendment claims.2 2 However, the court found that those claims by the
Haitians based on the "statutory right to counsel" provision of the INA23
failed as a matter of law because the INA, in defining the jurisdictions to
which it applied, failed to include Guantanamo Naval base, the location
of the alleged violations.

24

The government appealed to the Second Circuit challenging the lower
court's ruling that the Baker litigation did not collaterally estop the
plaintiffs.2 President Bush, during the course of the government's appeal,
issued the "Kennebunkport Order,"'26 which enabled the Coast Guard to
intercept and return, without screening, any boats carrying Haitian aliens
15. 953 F.2d at 1502.
16. 1992 WL 155853, at *2-*3.
17. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 6, 1992).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. 1992 WL 155853, at *5-*6.
21. Id. at *4.
22. Id. at *10.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
24. 1992 WL 155853, at *7.
25. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992).
26. Exec. Order 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
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in international waters to Haiti.2 7 The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order in regard to the executive order on
the 2basis
of its prior ruling that the INA did not apply to these plaintiffs. 8 From this denial the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit arguing that the district court had erred in construing Section 243(h) to be
inapplicable to aliens located extraterritorily.2 In regard to the government's appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction,
but did not pass upon the applicability of Section 243(h) of the INA."
However, the Second Circuit, in deciding the plaintiffs' appeal, found
that the INA does apply extraterritorily3 1
III.

DETAILS OF THE OPINION

In seeking reversal of the district court's denial of their motion for a
temporary restraining order, the plaintiffs contended that the Kennebunkport Order violated the following: (1) Section 243(h) of the INA,
(2) Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, 2 (3) the 1981 U.S.-Haiti agreement, (4) the Administrative
Procedures Act,8 and (5) the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment." The government countered each of these arguments and additionally asserted that the actions taken pursuant to the Kennebunkport Order were valid because of the following: (1) the Baker litigation
collaterally estopped the plaintiffs, and (2) the executive order was issued
pursuant to the express or implied authorization of Congress.8
A.

Preclusive Effect of Baker

The court began its analysis of the collateral estoppel issue by referring
to the definition given the plaintiff class ("Florida class") in Baker.' In
McNary the district court had defined the plaintiff class as "[a]ll Hai27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

969 F.2d at 1352-53.
1992 WL 155853, at *12.
969 F.2d at 1350.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1357.
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176

(1954).

33.
34.
35.
36.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
969 F.2d at 1354.
Id.
Id. The Baker (Florida) class was defined as "all Haitian aliens who are currently

detained or who will in the future be detained on U.S. Coast Guard cutters or at Guantanamo Naval base who were interdicted on the high seas pursuant to the United States interdiction program and who are being denied First Amendment and procedural rights." Id.
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tians who have been or will be 'screened in'" ("New York class").,7 The
court stated that for Baker to bind the New York class, they "must'have
been a party to, or represented by a privy in, the [Baker] action." s
Different Parties Existed In Baker. The court decided that the
New York class necessarily differed from the Florida class on the grounds
that the two groups had been subjected to different interdiction programs.5s The Florida class had challenged an interdiction program that
included a screening process whereas the New York class was challenging
a program implemented by the Kennebunkport Order that provided for
summary repatriation without screening.'
A Change in Circumstances also Vitiates Collateral Estoppel. The court then stated that even if the parties were substantially
the same in the two cases that a "change in facts essential to [the prior]
judgment" or an "intervening change in the applicable legal context" will
cause a court to hear a case that might otherwise be collaterally estopped." The court concluded that the issuance of the Kennebunkport
Order constituted an "intervening change in the applicable legal context.'4 The court als6 found support for the contention that the legal
landscape had changed in the context of the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Baker.'4

B. Section 243(h) of the INA"
Two questions of statutory interpretation existed as a result of the 1980
amendment to Section 243(h) of the INA: (1) whether the phrase "any
alien" encompassed aliens interdicted in international waters, and (2)
37.

Id. For an explanation of "screening," see supra note 14 and accompanying text.

38.

969 F.2d at 1355.

39.

Id. at 1354.

40. Id.
41.* Id. at 1356. See also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 159 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 28(2)(b) (1982).

969 F.2d at 1356.
43. Id. at 1356-57. The government, in opposing certiorari in Baker, had claimed that
"'screened in' individuals would be brought to the United States so that they could file
applications under the [INA] for asylum." Id. The court found that the subsequent actions
of the government were inconsistent with this assertion, and this "weigh[ed] significantly
against granting [Baker] preclusive effect in this action." Id. at 1357.
44. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text for the statutory language of section
243(h).
42.
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whether "return", as used in the statute, referred to the government's
5
actions.'

Are These Haitians Aliens? Relying on the plain language of the
statute and the statutory definition of alien in Section 101(a)(3) of the
INA," the court found that the Haitian plaintiffs in this case were indeed
"aliens" within the scope of Section 243(h)(1).' Section 101(a)(3) of the
INA states that an alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States.' 4 This was proof enough for the court to draw its conclusion; however, the 'government asserted four arguments contrary to the
plain language."
First, the government pointed to the canon of construction that "[the]
laws of the United States have no extraterritorial application.' 0 This canon' of construction was not applicable in this context, however, because
the presumption against extraterritorial application functions 'to prevent
"'unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
....

I ," Such was not the case here as the interdicted plaintiffs were not

attempting to enforce rights52 in American courts which would also be enforceable in Haitian courts.

Second, the government directed the court to Section 243(h)(2)(C) of
the INA' s which provided an exception to the applicability of Section
243(h)(1): Section 243(h)(1) would not apply if there existed a belief that
an alien had committed "a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United
States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States."', Focusing
on the "prior to" language, the government urged the court to find Section 243(h)(1) not applicable to the plaintiffs as they had not arrived in
the United States when the alleged violations occurred.," Relying again
on the fact that Congress had omitted the jurisdictional restrictions from
Section 243(h), the court refused to ascribe to Section 243(h)(2)(C) the
effect that the government argued for because to do so would vitiate the
congressional change in language. 6 In refusing to "rewrite [Section)
243(h)(1) into its pre-1980 status," the court noted that Section
45. 969 F.2d at 1358.
46. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(3) (1988).

47.
48.
49.
50.

969 F.2d at 1358.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988).
969 F.2d at 1358.
Id.

51. Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991)).

52. Id.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1988).

54. 969 F.2d at 1359 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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243(h)(2)(C) carved out an exception to Section 243(h)(1) by preserving
the pre-1980 distinction between aliens "'within the United States', and
all others."57
Third, the government made an argument based on the Whole Act
Rule.56 Because Section 243(h)(1) is located in Part V of the INA, and
because the provisions of Part V deal with deportation and apply only to
aliens within the United States, the government argued that Section
243(h) was not applicable."' However, this argument failed; Section
243(h)(1) deals not only with deportation, but also with "return" as a
result of the 1980 amendment.6 Therefore, Section 243(h) will have a
broader application than those provisions surrounding it. 1
Fourth, the court rejected the government's argument that the prohibition in Section 243(h)(1) applied only to the Attorney General and not to
the President." The court thought it unlikely that Congress intended this
prohibition to apply to only one "arm of the executive branch." 8 Having
concluded that the plaintiffs were indeed aliens within Section 243(h)(1),
the court proceeded to determine if the government's actions constituted
a "return" under that same section."
Did the Government's Actions Constitute a Return? Because
of Congress' failure to provide a statutory definition for "return" as it did
with "alien," 5 the court employed the mechanism of statutory construction whereby words are given their ordinary meaning." Relying both on
the ordinary meaning of "return" and the fact that Congress did not
qualify "return" with any restrictions as to where that return may occur
from, the court concluded that the government's actions constituted a
"return" within the meaning of Section 243(h)(1). 7 The government
posed no arguments in this regard, but rather urged the court to ascribe
to "return" the meaning given it by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.66 The government claimed that "return," as used in Article 33, only
57.
58.
words
in the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
The Whole Act Rule of statutory construction focuses not merely upon the general
of a particular clause, but also upon the meaning those general words should be given
context of the entire statute. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
969 F.2d at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
969 F.2d at 1360 (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990)).
Id. at 1361.
Id.
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prohibited a return of aliens "who ha[d] entered the territory of the contracting state." 0
Does "Return" in Article 33 Have the Meaning Ascribed to it
by the Government? The court began by setting out the provisions of
Article 33:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefits of the present section may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to
the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted
by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger
to the community of that country.'0
Stating that the same rules applicable in the context of statutory construction apply to the construction of treaties, the court turned to the
plain language of Article 33 for an answer." By giving "return" its ordinary meaning and by construing it in light of the overriding purpose of
Article 33, 72 the court found that "return" had the same meaning in Article 33 as it did in Section 243(h)(1).73 Therefore, the plain language of
Article 33 was inconsistent with the government's argument that it applied only to refugees within the territory of a contracting state.'4 Moreover, where the Refugee Convention had intended certain provisions to
apply only when a refugee had entered a contracting state's territory, it
'had done so with language to that effect."
The government asserted four arguments in support of a reading contrary to the courts. The first argument was that the Convention had used
the French term "refouler" conjunctively with "return.' 76 The plaintiffs
suggested however that the term implied "repelling or driving back an
69. Id.

70. Id. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
176 (1954). The United States is a party to the U.N. Protocol which incorporated Articles 2
through 34 of the 1951 Convention. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 2545.
71. 969 F.2d at 1362 (citing United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989)).
72. The court stated that the purpose of Article 33.1 was to "prevent all 'refugees,' 'in

any manner whatsoever,' from being put into the hands of those who would persecute
them." 969 F.2d at 1363.
73. 969 F.2d at 1362.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1362-63.
76. Id. at 1363. "Refouler," as defined by the government, means the ejection of an alien
from within a territory. Id.
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alien who has not yet entered."' "7The court opted for the plaintiffs definition.78 Were the government definition of "refouler" to be used, Article
33 would seem absurd because it "would forbid a state to 'expel or expel'
an alien.' 9 Furthermore, the government's response that "expel or return
('refouler')" was meant to be read as a "unitary whole" failed in light of
the French text of the treaty which used a disjunctive connector ("or")
between the two terms."0 Although conceding that a disjunctive reading
of these terms rendered the use of "expel" redundant, the court stated
that the Convention in all likelihood included "expel" as a matter of
specificity because it is a "term of art" within the Refugee Convention."'
Since the President had construed "return" as used in Article 33 not to
apply to "persons located outside the territory of the United States," the
government next argued that his interpretation should be given effect
here.82 The court refused to accept this argument because the executive
branch had offered contradictory interpretations in this regard. 8
The government, as it had when arguing the meaning of "alien" within
Section 243(h), next suggested that viewing the text of Article 33 and the
Convention as a whole supported its position." The court rejected this
argument by concluding that Article 33.2 carved out an exception to the
general rule as provided in Article 33.1, much the same way as Section
243(h)(2)(C) carved out an exception to Section 243(h)(1).8 The fact that
the Convention placed geographical limitations on actions taken in regard
to refugees elsewhere in the treaty fortified this interpretation."
As a final resort the government turned to the negotiating history of
the treaty. At the Convention, the Netherlands' representative sought to
place on record that "the Conference was in agreement that" the use of
"return ('refouler')" referred to "a refugee already within the territory [of
a contracting state] but not yet resident there."6 ' The court found this
portion of the negotiating history to be ambiguous, however, in that the
President of the Conference only agreed to enter on record "the interpretation given by the Netherlands representative" whereas the representa77. Id. at 1363.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1364.
83. Id.
84. Id. See supra note 58.
85. 969 F.2d at 1364. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
86. 969 F.2d at 1364.
87. Id. at 1365 (quoting Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 2/SR
35, at 21 (July 25, 1951) (remarks of Baron van Boetzelaer)).

968
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tive had sought to have it placed on record that the Conference "was in
agreement" as to his interpretation." Because this ambiguity existed, the
court' held firm in its stance that the government's actions constituted a
"return" in regard to both Article 33 and Section 243(h)(1).9
C. Does Article IP or Other Provisions of the INA Give the President
Power to Act in this Fashion?
In this regard the government first contended that the position of the
President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy empowered him
to enact the Kennebunkport Order.' 1 The government cited in support of
its argument United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,"' which stated
that "[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The
right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."' 9 3 The
court dismissed this argument by finding that the rule was not applicable
here: It was not for certain that the Haitians were heading for our shores
when interdicted and as such no need for exclusion existed.4
The government based its second argument on Sections 212(f) and
215(a)(1) of the INA" which provide that the President is authorized to
regulate the entry of aliens into the United States and also to "order the
summary return to their persecutors of aliens intercepted on the high
seas."0 Conceding the point that the Kennebunkport Order prohibited
the entry into the United States of some aliens, the court nevertheless
found -that the President had acted in a manner beyond the scope of
these provisions and in violation of Section 243(h)(1) by prohibiting the
Haitians from entering any other country.' 7
The government then claimed that the congressional grant of authority
to the Coast Guard "to compel compliance with the laws of the United
States on the high seas"" enabled the President to issue the Kennebunkport Order.9 The court dismissed this argument in that the Hai88.
89.

d.
d. at 1366.

90.

U.S. CONST.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

art. II.
969 F.2d at 1366.
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Id. at 542.
969 F.2d at 1366.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1988); 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (1988).
969 F.2d at 1366.
Id.

98. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1988).
99. 969 F.2d at 1367.
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tians "afloat on the international waters of the Windward Passage" were
not violating United States law.100
In a last ditch effort to preserve the Kennebunkport Order, the government argued that this case presented a political question beyond the powers of the judiciary. The court disagreed, finding that this case required a
"determination of whether the current interdiction program itself . . .
[was] consistent with a federal statute."101
D.

Conclusion of the Second Circuit

The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an injunction prohibiting the government "from returning to Haiti any interdicted
alien whose life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po02
litical opinion.'
IV.

ANALYSIS

Despite what appeared to be a very thorough analysis by the court in
McNary, the court failed to address several points that would otherwise
have mitigated against the conclusiveness of their findings.
A.

Collateral Estoppel

The court cited Montana v. United States'0 3 as the rule for collateral
estoppel.10' As Justice Rehnquist explained, Montana requires the following: (1) a "mutuality of parties," (2) "that the issue sought to be relitigated [is] identical to the issue already unsuccessfully litigated," and (3)
"that there [has] been no change in the controlling facts or legal principles since the [prior] action."' 0 5
The court found that the requisite mutuality of parties did not exist
simply because the two classes were subject to "different interdiction programs."10 6 Caselaw has consistently held that the inquiry into whether a
mutuality of parties exists requires a determination of whether the initial
class fairly represented the interests of the class bringing the second
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1367-68.
440 U.S. 147, 159 (1979).
969 F.2d at 1356.
United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 169 (1984).

106. 969 F.2d at 1355.
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suit. 07 A change in interdiction programs did not alter the fact that both
the New York and Florida classes sought to have the court find that the
protections of the INA applied extraterritorily. The type of interdiction
program was irrelevant in the context of deciding whether or not the INA
applied extraterritorily. The issue before the court was the applicability
of the INA, not the validity of the Kennebunkport Order."' Because both
plaintiff classes had as their primary interest a finding that they were
protected by the INA, the New York class should have been collaterally
estopped.
Second, there can be no doubt that the issue before the Second Circuit,
the applicability of the INA, was identical to that before the Eleventh
Circuit in Baker. The court acknowledged this fact by claiming that their
decision here would give rise to an explicit circuit split on the issue of the
applicability of the INA.'"
What exactly constitutes a "change in controlling facts or legal principles" has not received much judicial interpretation. 10 The court unnecessarily enlarged the scope of the relevant inquiry here to take notice of the
fact that the Kennebunkport Order altered the existing interdiction program to forego the screening processes which the INS had previously employed."' The court in Baker held that aliens interdicted in international
waters could not invoke the protections of Section 243(h)(1)."' Because
the court there did not take into account the interdiction program at the
time of this decision, the type of interdiction program could not have
been a controlling fact for the purposes of construing the INA. 1 Any
subsequent changes in interdiction programs only represented changes in
degree, not changes in kind, in the context of the prior adjudication.'
The INA did not instantaneously evolve to protect aliens outside of the
United States as a result of a change in interdiction programs. By taking
into account facts which were not controlling in regard to the prior deci107.

See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); 1B J. MooR & T. CURRIER,
0.41111] at 1255 (2d ed. 1965) ("representation of the interests
of the same person").
108. See Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. at 174 (declining to reach the merits of a statuMOoRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

tory question where collateral estoppel applied).
109. 969 F.2d at 1357.
110. O'Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[t]he proper
application of (Section] 28(2)(b) is largely unplumbed by the caselaw").

111.
112.
113.
114.

969 F.2d at 1357.
953 F.2d at 1510.
Id.
Changes in kind would be those directly affecting the way a law is to be interpreted,

i.e. a change in decisional law by the Supreme Court or a legislative amendment. See Clark

v. Troutman, 509 Pa. 336, 502 A.2d 137 (1985) (holding that a change in decisional law
mandated by the highest court within a judicial system is the type of change in legal context
contemplated by Section 28(2)(b)).
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sion, the court in McNary vitiated the primary function of collateral estoppel of giving finality to the judgments by which persons tailor their
conduct.'"
B. The INA
The court's conclusion that Section 243(h) applies to aliens outside of
the territory of the United States, although founded upon the strong presumption of "plain language," is contrary to the practical effect that the
drafters of the Refugee Act of 1980 intended it to have on that section.
The strongest evidence against the interpretation decided upon by the
court in McNary can be found in I.N.S. v. Stevic,116 a Supreme Court
case that arguably passed on the applicability of the INA."' In analyzing
the amended Section 243(h) to determine "the standard of proof an applicant must satisfy" to establish a threat of persecution, the Supreme
Court stated that "any alien within the United States is entitled to withholding [of deportation] if he meets the standard set forth [by the
amended Section 243(h)]." ' s Therefore, the Supreme Court presumed
that for an alien to benefit 1from
Section 243(h), the alien must indeed be
"within the United States.M1 9
Although the Supreme Court did not elaborate on its reasoning, an
analysis of the practical effect of the 1980 amendment to Section 243(h)
will provide the answer. Prior to 1968, Section 243(h) applied only to "deportable aliens" and not to "excludable aliens. 1 2 0 Deportable aliens were
those who had illegally entered the United States or those who had lost
their legal status after having legally entered. 12 1 Excludable aliens were
those who, although physically present in the United States, were deemed
to have been stopped at the border and hence outside of the United
States.12 2 When the 1980 amendment eliminated the "within the United
States" language, Congress merely intended to conform Section 243(h) to
the language of the Protocol, which drew no distinction between these
two types of aliens.12 3 Because excludable aliens had been previously
viewed as not present "within the United States," the elimination of this
115. See O'Leary, 923 F.2d at 1069 (twin aims of collateral estoppel are avoidance of
repetitive litigation and the promotion of the finality of judgments).

116. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
117. Id. at 422.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Douglas Gross, Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 26 COLUM. L.
REv. 1125, 1128 (1980).

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 467 U.S. at 416.
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language allowed those aliens, who were actually physically present
within the United States, to benefit from Section 243(h)."2 4
C. Executive Powers
Although the court sang the praises of "plain language" when interpreting Section 243(h) 1 2 it departed from that approach in regard to Sections 212(f) and 215(a)(1).1 26 The latter section states in relevant part:
"Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful -(1) for
any alien to . . . attempt to . . . enter the United States except under
such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe ....
,,"2' The court
here apparently found that the President had acted beyond the scope of
this section; however, to use the court's own reasoning against it, if Congress had intended to limit the powers of the executive in prescribing limitations and exceptions, it surely knew how to do so. The court in Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey"12 found these provisions indicative of
congressional intent to "allow[] the Executive Branch to exercise its
broad discretion regarding alien immigration." 12
' Any congressional intent that the INA should apply extraterritorily was nonexistent according
to Gracey as the court there noted that Congress had approved the interdiction program which was being challenged by continuing to fund
it.18 0 Congress has, no doubt, long been aware of the holding in Gracey
and other cases that the INA does not apply extraterritorily. In the absence of congressional action contrary to these holdings, the court in McNary should have concluded that these prior interpretations had gained
congressional approval and not have ruled as it did.

124. "Commentators appear to be in accord with th[e] view" that "the Protocol was not
intended to govern parties' conduct outside of their national borders." Haitian Refugee Ctr.
v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 840 n.132, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring). In support of this contention, Judge Edwards cited to Aga Khan, Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons, 149 RECUEIL DEs CouRs (Hague Academy of International
Law) 287, 318 (1976); Weis, The United Nations Declarationon TerritorialAsylum, 7 CAN.
Y. INT'L. L..92, 123-24 (1969); and Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80
COLUM. L. Rav. 1125, 1126-27 (1980). 809 F.2d at 840 n.132.
125. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
126. 969 F.2d at 1366.
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (1988).
128, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
129. 600 F. Supp. at 1399.
130. Id. at 1399-1400.
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CONCLUSION

President Clinton's campaign promise to change the interdiction program implemented by the Kennebunkport Order appeared to render
moot any decision by the Supreme Court on this issue.18 ' However, in
light of the recent policy reversal by the new administration,8 2 President
Clinton may find himself thanking a conservative Court should they reverse the Second Circuit and authorize the type of executive action taken
by the Kennebunkport Order.
ROBERT A. WEBER, JR.

131. President-elect Clinton promised on November 12, 1992, that he would reverse the
Bush administration's policy of summarrily repatriating Haitian. aliens without first providing them with an immigration hearing. Clinton Vows Tax Breaks, Jobs, Diversity, CHI.
TaB., Nov. 12, 1992, at C1.

132. "In an effort to head off a flotilla of refugees next week, President-elect Bill Clinton
reversed a campaign pledge Thursday and said he would continue temporarily the current
Bush policy of forcibly returning Haitian boat people." Matthew Vita and Beth Kurylo,
Clinton to Haitians: Stay Home, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Jan. 15, 1993, at B2.

